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World War II proved to be another trying time for the ACLU, with many
liberals and even some pacifists opposed to its defence of conscientious objectors.
Baldwin sought to maintain cordial relations with federal agencies, an approach
that troubled some board members, including Norman Thomas. The ACLU
responded hesitantly to the internment of Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens
but did seek to improve the status of internees, albeit to little avail. ACLU mem-
bers outside New York, like Ernest Besig and A.L. Wirin of the Northern
California and Southern California affiliates, respectively, attempted to contest the
actual internments. A similar conflict appeared at the national level regarding the
prosecution of native fascists, once more pitting, in Kutulas’s words, relativists
against absolutists. The ambitions of the ACLU only broadened after the war, with
Baldwin determined to protect the rights of black Americans and workers and to
assist both Japan and Germany in laying a foundation for civil liberties. The
ACLU remained splintered, divided between an anti-communist wing and anoth-
er group even more hostile to communists. Distressing too were Baldwin’s inept
administrative bent and his authoritarian makeup in dealing with staff members.
The ACLU hardly adopted a staunchly civil libertarian perspective regarding the
ability of communist teachers to remain in the classroom, the federal loyalty oath
program, Congress’ investigation of the Hollywood film industry, and the federal
prosecution of Communist Party leaders. The organization failed to support the
commutation of the death sentences meted out to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,
vacillated about deportation hearings pertaining to labor leader Harry Bridges, and
refused to contest the denial of a passport to entertainer-activist Paul Robeson.
Meanwhile, affiliates chafed at policies determined by the National ACLU, oppos-
ing its anticommunist fixation, as the organization grew under new leadership dur-
ing the 1950s. Now guided by Patrick Murphy Malin, the ACLU sought to create
a genuinely national organization that would have greater legislative influence.
The American Civil Liberties Union and the Making of Modern Liberalism, 1930-
1960 joins the small body of essential works examining the ACLU and its relation-
ship to the once dominant strand of thought in the United States. It joins earlier
studies by Samuel Walker, Donald Johnson, and Peggy Lamson that grapple with
the complexity of the nation’s leading civil liberties organization and its relation-
ship to both liberalism and radicalism.
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D avid L. Tu bb s, Freedom’s Orphans: Contemporary Liberalism and the Fate of
American Children (Princeton NJ: Princeton Unive rsity Pre s s, 2 0 0 7 ) .
In Freedom’s Orphans: Contemporary Liberalism and the Fate of American Children, David
L. Tubbs critiques contemporary American liberalism, arguing throughout that
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“personal freedom of adults” has routinely outweighed the “competing interests
of children” (17). Each of his five chapters provide a venue for dissecting and
criticising the writing of liberal theorists or the judgments from various Supreme
Court cases.
Tubbs holds that all children, defined as those seventeen and under, are
dependant and impressionable, requiring more than just shelter and food.
Through an examination of the arguments of liberal theorists and liberal jurists of
the Supreme Court, he argues that “the exercise of certain freedoms by adults –
including some freedoms having the status of constitutionally protected rights –
…adversely affect children” (4). He laments “a growing indifference to what were
long considered important elements of the welfare of children” that “can be seen
at the highest levels of law and academic political theory” (5). Although histori-
cally American liberalism has defended the interests of children, he sees a shift in
the post-World War Two era liberalism that has become “indifferent to what were
previously considered crucial elements of the welfare of children” (12).
Tubbs sees a moral reticence within contemporary liberalism that is detri-
mental to children due to its defence of “unhindered choice” (13). He sees con-
temporary liberalism as “morally reticent.” Theorists reluctant to “distinguish
between the good and the bad use of legally protected freedoms” confuse
“responsible and irresponsible exercise of freedom” (20). Liberalism has become
increasingly more permissive, allowing moral reticence to pose an unprecedented
danger to children due to their dependence and impressionability. Liberals no
longer acknowledge  “responsibilities and possible abuses of freedom” (36).
Tubbs tries to show how liberal feminism has undermined the interests
of children. His treatment of the writing of feminist theorist Susan Moller Okin
is condescending and churlish, dismissing her arguments as  “unpersuasive” and
“underdeveloped,” (59) stating “we can hope that Okin would recognize the rea-
sonableness of such concerns, but that might be expecting too much” (93). On
Okin’s defence of a woman’s fundamental right to make decisions regarding her
sexuality and reproduction, Tubbs posits that “as a moral argument this line of
thinking is underdeveloped since it nowhere considers the possibility that the fetus
or unborn child might also be an ‘equal citizen’” (59). Men, he asserts, could use
the argument of women’s reproductive rights to absolve themselves of responsi-
bility, leading to “diminished life prospects of children in single-parent families”
(77). The state, he stresses, should not assume responsibility for an absent parent.
Rather, the state should ensure that a child is supported by two “lawfully married”
heterosexual parents (79).
Tubbs perpetuates stereotypes of homosexuality and promotes homo-
phobia while arguing that same-sex unions discount children’s interests, that
“behaviour, norms, and living arrangements of same-sex couples might affect
other persons in society, especially women in real marriages and children being
raised by homosexuals” (84). Homosexuals, he asserts, do not support an expec-
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tation of “love and sexual exclusivity” (82) between partners, maintaining that
“indifference to real fidelity in so many homosexual relationships should have an
impact on the moral development of children” (84). He criticises arguments sup-
porting “the freedom of homosexuals to “marry” and adopt children and avail
themselves of new reproductive technologies to start their own families,” as being
“grounded in both liberalism and feminism,” that attempt to “enlarge the scope of
individual freedom” while trying to “dismantle” or “confound” gender by attack-
ing conventional sex roles” (60). He discounts Okin’s research, charging that she
exaggerates gender inequalities in marriage and confuses “potential” and “actual”
injustice (71). Attempting to discount her work, not to mention the lives of many
women and homosexuals, by littering his criticism by enclosing terms such as
“gender” or “gay” or homosexual “unions” in unnecessary quotation marks, he
condescendingly employs phrases such as “Okin should admit” or she “needs to
be mindful,” (71) while unfoundedly and inaccurately claiming that “in many
places” she “overstates the historical subordination of women” (73). In short he
fails to convince that a defence of reproductive rights for women, and the right to
parent in a family of one’s choice, has fundamentally neglected children’s interests.
According to Tubbs the Supreme Court “wrongly decided” (100) three
cases legalizing the sale of contraceptives (Griswold v Connecticut; Eisenstadt v Baird;
and Carey v Population Service International), establishing the “right to privacy,” or
promiscuity (13). The Supreme Court failed in its duty to promote the “monoga-
mous two-parent family as a social norm and as the family structure most con-
ducive to the welfare of children” (100). He criticises the Court for not consider-
ing children’s interests as it “failed to explore the link between one’s freely consent-
ing sexual relations and basic parental duties” (100). Furthermore, the court did
consider the “diminished life prospects of children issuing from non-marital rela-
tions” (100). Restricting the sale of contraceptives, he believes, protected children
by discouraging promiscuity.
Tubbs criticises the Supreme Court’s approach towards reproductive
technologies for heterosexual, homosexual and single women that did not ask if
“such arrangements are consistent with basic interests of children” (136). “Several
justices” of the Supreme Court according to Tubbs support “unhindered choice”
(13) while “disregarding important interests of children” (99). In his view the
Court should not have been involved, leaving state legislators in control of local
policy. Tubbs maintains that attention to “right to privacy” negatively affects the
“life prospects” of children while discounting their interests.
The Supreme Court draws his criticism for characterizing children some-
times as impressionable and dependent, and other times considers them to have
moral abilities of an adult. He contrasts an impressionable child who should,
according to Court decision, not be exposed to the bible in school, with the child
who, when “incidentally” exposed to hard-core pornography, be able to exhibit
strong moral fortitude and be unaffected. The Court has stopped taking into
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account “the susceptibilities of the young” (210).
Tubbs does see the possibility of a liberalism that is not detrimental to
children. Freedom does not depend on individual liberties that harm children. He
acknowledges a “value-pluralism movement within liberalism” that suggests a new
liberalism that considers personal freedom and individual rights important, while
allowing a restriction of adults’ rights to safeguard children. Legislators, not the
courts, should ensure that a balance between competing rights is effected.
Joselyn Morely
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Linda Gordon, The Moral Property of Women: A History of Birth Control
Politics in America (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2007).
In updating and revising her classic 1976 study of reproductive rights, Woman’s
Body, Woman’s Right, historian Linda Gordon provides an illuminating and timely
addition to our understanding of the intersection between gender equality and
reproductive control, which she designates “the single most important factor in
the material basis of women’s emancipation” of the past century (3). A social his-
tory of birth control and the quest for female sexual freedom, her book offers an
in-depth analysis of four distinct phases of the birth control movement: the nine-
teenth century campaign for ‘voluntary motherhood’, which paralleled the drive
for suffrage; early twentieth century links between birth control advocacy and rad-
ical movements, primarily socialism, that sought to ‘empower the powerless’—
poor people and women; the shift away from radicalism into mainstream liberal-
ism from the 1920s through the 1970s, especially through the family planning con-
cept promoted by the Planned Parenthood Federation, the only national birth con-
trol organization until abortion reform in the 1960s; and, finally, the post-1970s
politics of reproductive rights, with special attention to the role of the Christian
right. Gordon’s core argument is that reproductive control has always been cen-
tral to women’s status, and opposition to it a fundamental component of opposi-
tion to gender equality.
Gordon deftly weaves her narrative through the historical landscape of
nineteenth and twentieth century America, linking reproductive issues to the Great
Depression, two world wars, and to ideological influences like progressivism
(which was less concerned with feminism, Gordon suggests, than with elitism—
hence its association with the eugenics movement and its emphasis on selectivity
— producing babies “of great merit” rather than merely reducing overall birth
rates) (174). Such elitism survived the demise of the progressive movement and
continued to permeate birth control discourse and policy: in the 1940s and 1950s,
Planned Parenthood urged mothers to stay at home and concentrate on raising
smaller, “better” families with the help of contraceptives (276).
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